

# ទាយបាប ការទាម្ចារទេសទូទៅ ប្រជាសិក្សាតែង

**WEEKLY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL  
SURVEILLANCE REPORT**

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กามโรค กรกฎาคม 2530	
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## การสอบสวนโรค

## อาหารเป็นพิษ - พิจิตร

วันที่ 3 กันยายน พ.ศ. 2530 ผู้ป่วย 4 ราย ถูกนำส่งโรงพยาบาลโพธาราม  
อำเภอโพธาราม จังหวัดพิจิตร ด้วยอาการคลื่นไส้ อาเจียน ปวดท้อง และถ่ายอุจจาระเหลว  
ผู้ป่วยทั้ง 4 ราย มาจากครอบครัวเดียวกันในหมู่ที่ 3 ตำบลล้ำทัยน้ำ อำเภอโพธาราม  
จังหวัดพิจิตร ผู้ป่วยมีอายุตั้งแต่ 19 - 30 ปี เพศหญิง 3 ราย ชาย 1 ราย ไม่มีผู้ใดเสียชีวิต ทุกรายเริ่มมีอาการป่วยในเวลาใกล้เคียงกัน ต้องรีบารมณ์ 10.00 น. วันที่ 3 กันยายน พ.ศ. 2530 ทุกรายมีอาการคลื่นไส้ อาเจียน ปวดท้อง 2 ราย มีอาการถ่ายอุจจาระเหลวร่วมด้วย ครอบครัวนี้มีสมาชิกทั้งหมด 8 คน จากการซักประวัติการกินอาหารทราบว่า ตั้งแต่วันที่ 1 ถึงเช้าวันที่ 3 กันยายน พ.ศ. 2530 สมาชิกทั้ง 8 คนของครอบครัวนี้กินอาหารเหมือนกัน ยกเว้นผู้ป่วย 4 ราย ซึ่งกินต้มเห็ดเวลา 7.00 น. ของวันที่ป่วย ส่วนผู้ไม่ป่วยทั้ง 4 ราย ไม่ได้กินต้มเห็ด ไม่ได้ส่งตรวจสิ่งอาเจียน อุจจาระ และเห็ด การเกิดอาหารเป็นพิษครั้งนี้อาจเกิดจากการกินเห็ดที่มีพิษ ได้ให้คำแนะนำต่อผู้ป่วย ห้ามบริโภคเห็ดในการซื้อที่ไม่แน่ใจว่าเห็ดชนิดจะปลอดภัยต่อการบริโภค

## ផ្នែរយោង

พนักงานระบาดวิทยา สำนักงานสาธารณสุขจังหวัดพิจิตร

บทความ

## Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings

U. S. Department of Health and Human Services  
 Public Health Service  
 Centers for Disease Control  
 Atlanta, Georgia 30333

(ต่อจากฉบับที่แล้ว: Vol. 18 No. 38)

### Testing of Patients

Previous CDC recommendations have emphasized the value of HIV serologic testing of patients for: 1) management of parenteral or mucous-membrane exposures of health-care workers, 2) patient diagnosis and management, and 3) counseling and serologic testing to prevent and control HIV transmission in the community. In addition, more recent recommendations have stated that hospitals, in conjunction with state and local health departments, should periodically determine the prevalence of HIV infection among patients from age groups at highest risk of infection (32).

Adherence to universal blood and body-fluid precautions recommended for the care of all patients will minimize the risk of transmission of HIV and other blood-borne pathogens from patients to health-care workers. The utility of routine HIV serologic testing of patients as an adjunct to universal precautions is unknown. Results of such testing may not be available in emergency or outpatient settings. In addition, some recently infected patients will not have detectable antibody to HIV (Table 1).

Personnel in some hospitals have advocated serologic testing of patients in settings in which exposure of health-care workers to large amounts of patients' blood may be anticipated. Specific patients for whom serologic testing has been advocated include those undergoing major operative procedures and those undergoing treatment in critical-care units, especially if they have conditions involving uncontrolled bleeding. Decisions regarding the need to establish testing programs for patients should be made by physicians or individual institutions. In addition, when deemed appropriate, testing of individual patients may be performed on agreement between the patient and the physician providing care.

In addition to the universal precautions recommended for all patients, certain additional precautions for the care of HIV-infected patients undergoing major surgical operations have been proposed by personnel in some hospitals. For example, surgical procedures on an HIV-infected patient might be altered so that hand-to-hand passing of sharp instruments would be eliminated; stapling instruments rather than

TABLE 2. Predictive value of positive HIV-antibody tests in hypothetical populations with different prevalences of infection

	Prevalence of infection	Predictive value of positive test*
Repeatedly reactive enzyme immunoassay (EIA) <sup>†</sup>	0.2%	28.41%
	2.0%	80.16%
	20.0%	98.02%
Repeatedly reactive EIA followed by positive Western blot (WB) <sup>§</sup>	0.2%	99.75%
	2.0%	99.97%
	20.0%	99.99%

\*Proportion of persons with positive test results who are actually infected with HIV.

<sup>†</sup>Assumes EIA sensitivity of 99.0% and specificity of 99.5%.

<sup>§</sup>Assumes WB sensitivity of 99.0% and specificity of 99.9%.

hand-suturing equipment might be used to perform tissue approximation; electrocautery devices rather than scalpels might be used as cutting instruments; and, even though uncomfortable, gowns that totally prevent seepage of blood onto the skin of members of the operative team might be worn. While such modifications might further minimize the risk of HIV infection for members of the operative team, some of these techniques could result in prolongation of operative time and could potentially have an adverse effect on the patient.

Testing programs, if developed, should include the following principles:

- Obtaining consent for testing.
- Informing patients of test results, and providing counseling for seropositive patients by properly trained persons.
- Assuring that confidentiality safeguards are in place to limit knowledge of test results to those directly involved in the care of infected patients or as required by law.
- Assuring that identification of infected patients will not result in denial of needed care or provision of suboptimal care.
- Evaluating prospectively 1) the efficacy of the program in reducing the incidence of parenteral, mucous-membrane, or significant cutaneous exposures of health-care workers to the blood or other body fluids of HIV-infected patients and 2) the effect of modified procedures on patients.

### Testing of Health-Care Workers

Although transmission of HIV from infected health-care workers to patients has not been reported, transmission during invasive procedures remains a possibility. Transmission of hepatitis B virus (HBV)—a blood-borne agent with a considerably greater potential for nosocomial spread—from health-care workers to patients has been documented. Such transmission has occurred in situations (e.g., oral and gynecologic surgery) in which health-care workers, when tested, had very high concentrations of HBV in their blood (at least 100 million infectious virus particles per milliliter, a concentration much higher than occurs with HIV infection), and the health-care workers sustained a puncture wound while performing invasive procedures or had exudative or weeping lesions or microlacerations that allowed virus to contaminate instruments or open wounds of patients (33,34).

The hepatitis B experience indicates that only those health-care workers who perform certain types of invasive procedures have transmitted HBV to patients. Adherence to recommendations in this document will minimize the risk of transmission of HIV and other blood-borne pathogens from health-care workers to patients during invasive procedures. Since transmission of HIV from infected health-care workers performing invasive procedures to their patients has not been reported and would be expected to occur only very rarely, if at all, the utility of routine testing of such health-care workers to prevent transmission of HIV cannot be assessed. If consideration is given to developing a serologic testing program for health-care workers who perform invasive procedures, the frequency of testing, as well as the issues of consent, confidentiality, and consequences of test results—as previously outlined for testing programs for patients—must be addressed.

### Management of Infected Health-Care Workers

Health-care workers with impaired immune systems resulting from HIV infection or other causes are at increased risk of acquiring or experiencing serious complications of infectious disease. Of particular concern is the risk of severe infection following exposure to patients with infectious diseases that are easily transmitted if appropriate precautions are not taken (e.g., measles, varicella). Any health-care worker with an impaired immune system should be counseled about the potential risk associated with taking care of patients with any transmissible infection and should continue to follow existing recommendations for infection control to minimize risk of exposure to other infectious agents (7,35). Recommendations of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP) and institutional policies concerning requirements for vaccinating health-care workers with live-virus vaccines (e.g., measles, rubella) should also be considered.

The question of whether workers infected with HIV—especially those who perform invasive procedures—can adequately and safely be allowed to perform patient-care duties or whether their work assignments should be changed must be determined on an individual basis. These decisions should be made by the health-care worker's personal physician(s) in conjunction with the medical directors and personnel health service staff of the employing institution or hospital.

### Management of Exposures

If a health-care worker has a parenteral (e.g., needlestick or cut) or mucous-membrane (e.g., splash to the eye or mouth) exposure to blood or other body fluids or has a cutaneous exposure involving large amounts of blood or prolonged contact with blood—especially when the exposed skin is chapped, abraded, or afflicted with dermatitis—the source patient should be informed of the incident and tested for serologic evidence of HIV infection after consent is obtained. Policies should be developed for testing source patients in situations in which consent cannot be obtained (e.g., an unconscious patient).

If the source patient has AIDS, is positive for HIV antibody, or refuses the test, the health-care worker should be counseled regarding the risk of infection and evaluated clinically and serologically for evidence of HIV infection as soon as possible after the exposure. The health-care worker should be advised to report and seek medical evaluation for any acute febrile illness that occurs within 12 weeks after the exposure. Such an illness—particularly one characterized by fever, rash, or lymphadenopathy—may be indicative of recent HIV infection. Seronegative health-care workers should be retested 6 weeks post-exposure and on a periodic basis thereafter (e.g., 12 weeks and 6 months after exposure) to determine whether transmission has occurred. During this follow-up period—especially the first 6-12 weeks after exposure, when most infected persons are expected to seroconvert—exposed health-care workers should follow U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) recommendations for preventing transmission of HIV (36,37).

No further follow-up of a health-care worker exposed to infection as described above is necessary if the source patient is seronegative unless the source patient is at high risk of HIV infection. In the latter case, a subsequent specimen (e.g., 12 weeks following exposure) may be obtained from the health-care worker for antibody testing. If the source patient cannot be identified, decisions regarding appropriate follow-up should be individualized. Serologic testing should be available to all health-care workers who are concerned that they may have been infected with HIV.

If a patient has a parenteral or mucous-membrane exposure to blood or other body fluid of a health-care worker, the patient should be informed of the incident, and the same procedure outlined above for management of exposures should be followed for both the source health-care worker and the exposed patient.

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